An astounding piece of pro-Labour propaganda from Robert Peston, says Biased BBC contributor Alan

‘The Party’s Over:How the West Went Bust ‘
In a one hour programme describing how we ended up bust and bankrupt Peston does not mention ‘Labour’ by name once…even more remarkably the man who was Chancellor of the Exchequer and Prime Minister in Labour’s 13 year Great Leap Backward, Gordon Brown, also remains unmentioned. Who does Peston conclude is to blame for the present little economic difficulty we find ourselves in? Peston reveals the culprits, not Blair, not Brown, not George Bush, not the corrupt and unworkable European Union but that old BBC enemy Mrs Thatcher, with Cold War Hero Ronald Reagan thrown in for good measure.

 ‘Thatcher and Reagan introduced a new global economy that lead to the great unravelling we’re experiencing now.’

Curious really when you read what Stephanie Flanders wrote in 2005 about Brown’s stewardship….

 ‘Britain is growing slower than it has in more than a decade. The high street has ground to a halt, and inflation is the highest it has been under Labour. When we look back, in a few years’ time, at Brown’s economy, will we still see an economic miracle? Or another old-fashioned spending binge that, sooner or later, had to run dry? What is left of the miracle economy, if you strip out the cheap imports and the consumer spending? What is left is a lot of public spending. The only part of the economy that has grown faster than spending by all of us the past few years has been spending by the government.’

and read this for good measure….

(Blair) ‘painted us a rosy picture of a Britain at home in its own skin. Part right. But it can hardly be entirely true of a country with the worst cancer survival rates in Western Europe, where young people cannot afford homes, pensioners have taken a severe financial battering while multimillionaires are created overnight and violent crime is rampant on sink estates where the law surrendered years ago.’


Biased BBC reader Alan asks the question; “Why is Robert Peston so successful?”

“It’s because he is so supremely interesting and stupendously intelligent. Or so so he tells us.

In the Sunday Times Peston says he is setting up an organisation to provide inspirational speakers to schools…great thinkers from the worlds of business, politics, sports and journalism amongst others.

He is annoyed that it is public schools such as Eton that seem to get the most speakers….’To my amazement these incredibly confident kids implied that they were doing me a favour by inviting me (to speak)….they took it for granted that the most interesting and brainy people (er like himself?) would talk to them.’

Peston has created ‘Speakers for Schools’ to get more speakers into state schools….oh and with the evil Tories putting up the price of further education and mass unemployment this is ‘more important than ever.’

Seems a harmless enough story with a well meaning Peston……only who decides who the speakers are….do they have to be ‘on message’….and what is that message….say for example on climate change?

Consider how many other organisations the BBC is closely involved with which push a message.

The CMEP (Cambridge Media Environment Programme) co-run by Roger Harrabin or the Science Media Centre….also part run by BBC staff….or Futerra or the New Economics Foundation…or indeed the
UEA and the Tyndall Research Centre.

Organisations that aim to channel information to other media organisations, politicians and businesses about climate change and its presentation. They seek to become the main sources for that information.

Is that really OK or slightly sinister? If the main source for information about climate change comes from a pro climate change body that can hardly be good. The BBC is in effect taking control of not only its own output and what appears in it about climate change but is also able to control and influence what other media organisations and politicians broadcast or decide.

 Here is what the BBC’s favourite ‘communications agency’, Futerra, tells then about presentation:

‘Forget the climate change detractors. Those who deny climate change science are irritating, but
unimportant. The argument is not about if we should deal with climate change, but how we should deal with climate change. Create a trusted, credible, recognised voice on climate change. We need trusted organisations and individuals that the media can call upon to explain the implications of climate change to the
UK public.’

The BBC does block dissenting voices…especially ones that are popular and credible…such as David Bellamy….but is happy to have David Attenborough promote AGW.

The BBC has decided the issues surrounding climate change are no longer in doubt….it is merely a matter of presentation. The problem is that the public, the vast majority of which do not believe in AGW, are ‘sceptical’ because they are too stupid, ignorant and confused as Harrabin helpfully points out…..

‘Private Virtue, Public Good
Roger Harrabin
Published 15 May 2006

Facing up to climate change is often framed by government as an issue of personal responsibility. What if the public rejects this view, asks Roger Harrabin Who should take action to stop climate change – the government or the public? What if we took public opinion at face value? What if people are genuinely confused by the baffling notion that emissions from their central heating may be contributing to the drought in East Africa?  So as No 10 longs for public consensus on climate change and detects signs of growing voter concern, public ignorance and confusion still abound. And there is no sign that the scientific debate is about to stop. This is not an equation we can expect the public to master on its own.’

What other organisations does the BBC run to promote its political and social ends? Its ‘Real world Brainstorm’ conferences in which it aims to get other organisations to work together with a certain ‘vision’?

Of course there is John Humphrys and his part ownership of the polling company ‘YouGuv’….who knows what other activities BBC employees get up to when not doing the day job. And not forgetting the World Service which openly admits it aims to influence politics and societies.

Somewhat beyond the remit of informing, educating and entertaining us.”


One of the joys of editing this blog is the frequent emails I receive from so many readers. I do try to respond to as many as possible although  sometimes this can be tricky if I am away from BBBC central, as has been the case for most of this past week. Thank you all for the great and frequent contributions made publicly and sometimes privately. I wish I had more time to focus on this but as Booker T put it, Time is tight! Here is a guest article submitted by Clameur de Haro for which I am indebted.

Financial Crisis Flavoured With Pesto Sauce
One should by now, I suppose, be resigned to the inevitability of any so-called investigative documentary produced by the BBC depicting a predominantly one-sided and partisan account of its subject-matter. In that negative sense at least, Robert Peston’s documentary “Britain’s Banks – Too Big To Save?”, which aired on BBC on Tuesday evening of this week, did not disappoint: because it maintained, for this viewer, the Corporation’s lamentable standards for that depressing genre, and in a number of areas. 
Few readers will fail to recollect, particularly during Gordon Brown’s reign at the Treasury but persisting through his disastrous premiership, Peston’s seeming uncanny closeness and access to Brown and the claque surrounding him, which manifested itself in a number of apparent journalistic coups either presenting, or at least sympathetic to, the Brownian position. And surprise, surprise – conspicuous by its almost complete absence in Tuesday night’s programme was any disinterested assessment of what part might have been played by Brown and his government, if not in directly causing, then certainly in at least exacerbating the effect in Britain, of the financial crisis of 2008.
Whether its was the programme’s intention to deflect any examination of Brownian culpability by naked pandering to populist banker-bashing prejudice in explicitly attributing virtually all blame to the usual “excessive risk-taking by bankers solely in pursuit of bonuses” mantra is a moot point: but a signal disregard of the extent of any governmental contribution was certainly the most egregious effect.

We can revert to that specific point in a few paragraphs’ time. For the moment, it will do no harm to pinpoint some of the programme’s other shortcomings.
Generally, the overall tone was none-too-subtly characterised by some obvious cinematic tricks – firstly, discussing complicated financial derivative instruments against the visual backdrop of Peston betting at a racecourse, and secondly, recounting the post-2000 rise in the size of banks’ balance sheets against the visual backdrop of champagne being poured into glasses. Heaven forbid that we might not get the message the programme was so visibly desperate to convey – it’s all just toffs gambling wot caused it all, innit? 
There was precious little, if any, mention of the origins of the sub-prime crisis: yet, as most interested students and serious commentators are aware, its roots were planted by Democratic administrations in the US. They it was who forced lenders, on pain of severe legal and regulatory sanctions, to extend credit to manifestly credit-unworthy borrowers in furtherance of political correctness-inspired perceptions of unfairly disadvantaged minorities: they it was who encouraged the deterioration in credit quality of the resultant expansion of sub-prime lending by their implicit federal guarantees to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, allowing them to source funding at cheaper rates than their commercial competitors. 
The role of the principal rating agencies in their assessment of mortgage-backed securities and their derivative instruments was barely referenced at all. Several academic papers, however, demonstrate how the agencies’ miscalculated (because of relying on probabilities based on historical data) predictions of future delinquency and default rates, which failed to factor in the new dynamic of sub-prime and non-prime lending, assigned wholly and unrealistically optimistic ratings to many of the innovative structures created.
The effect of changes in accounting standards on the valuation of banks’ investments didn’t figure noticeably in the narrative. Yet many interested students and serious commentators have long recognised the impact on balance sheets and leveraging which was caused by investments being allowed to be carried on balance sheets at often-inflated and always-volatile market value rather than the lower of market value or cost.
In fairness, there was reference to both the role of the Greenspan-led Federal Reserve in wrongly responding to previous crises by lowering interest rates and expanding the money supply: and to the degree of internal flexibility and autonomy in risk-rating their lending exposures allowed to banks under the Basel II financial regulatory regime, which coincided with the build-up to the crisis breaking.   
Needless to say, though, it was overwhelmingly bankers’ wilful and reckless short-termism in pursuit of individual bonuses that made up Peston’s case, with the backdrop of Lehman Brothers’ London office much in evidence. But strangely, Peston omitted to mention that a majority of Lehman bonuses were actually paid in the form of deferred Lehman stock, and with a vesting period as long as 5 years. That’s not exactly short-termist.               
It’s nevertheless undeniable, for all this, that yes, the financial services industry was at fault (or more accurately, the proportionately small number of relevant employees in the risk-taking areas and their supervisors). But – and it’s a very large but – the argument remains, uncongenial and inconvenient though it might have been for Peston to contemplate it, never mind admit it, that the Brown/Darling chancellorships bear a considerable responsibility. And this was hardly addressed at all.   
The regulatory regime that proved so ineffectual in the UK was the specific creation of Brown and Ed Balls in 1997. Many have argued persuasively that Brown wanted to remove overall systemic prudential oversight and regulation from the Bank of England, so that the Bank would have no mandate to warn of systemic risk when his always-planned, recklessly-profligate, and ultimately disastrous expansion of public spending, masked cynically by his equally disastrous indulgence of a hyper-expansion of personal debt to give the masses the illusion of prosperity, eventually became apparent.
The result was a Bank of England restricted to managing inflation and interest rates through a Monetary Policy Committee nominated by Brown: a fiscal policy in effect untrammelled and unchallenged through its residing in Brown and his partisan political coterie in the Treasury: and an Financial Services Authority obliged by Brown to concentrate its regulation on an individual institution-by-institution basis, and on such weighty issues as how long call centres took to answer incoming calls, rather than on the stresses building up in the entire system.
The resultant accident waiting to happen was compounded when Darling, with Brown tweaking his puppet-strings, decided to rescue Northern Rock. The Crock wasn’t in any way systemically pivotal at the time, and to allow its flawed funding model to send it under would have reinforced the concept of moral hazard and possibly sent out a signal that might have partially alleviated the catastrophes of one year later, particularly in the equally badly run HBOS. But the Crock was saved with taxpayers’ money solely to avoid the political fallout to Brown and Labour from the collapse of its mortgage business and the consequent job losses in one of Labour’s electoral heartlands.
Brown it was too who hoodwinked a not then grievously-exposed Lloyds TSB into taking over, quickly and, as it later transpired, with insufficient due diligence, the wreck that was Asda Salesman Hornby’s HBOS, and Brown also who, until 2007, was tribally exulting the successes of a Scottish bank to all and sundry. It’s very arguable that, but for the malign influence of Brown, the regulatory regime might well have been better positioned to mitigate the scale of the damage. It’s noticeable that, in both Canada and Australia, the extent of the crisis was comparatively muted. 
Yet this absolutely fundamental question as to the extent of the crisis in Britain, as distinct from other countries, was largely ignored by the programme. That its central conclusion – in future, banks might be too big to bail out and also too big to fail – might be countered by a better governmental regulatory structure than that which Brown designed and presided over, didn’t come into it.
But then again, this is Robert Peston and the BBC we’re talking about, isn’t it?         


It’s going to be a crunch week for the Coalition and the BBC is out to ensure maximum damage, as one would anticipate from such a biased leftist broadcaster. So, take the news this morning that the leaders of 35 of the UK’s most successful large companies have come out supporting Chancellor Osborne’s approach to making the necessary cuts. It’s good news for wee Georgie but Robert Pesto (He who speaks in an odd voice) isn’t impressed. As he puts it...

“However, some people would point out that these bosses may be experts at running businesses but that does not make them experts at how best to manage the economy, our correspondent adds.”

Great point, Robert, Oh, and some of them are are “widely viewed” as ..gasp, supporters of the Conservative Party. Where will it end? Who needs Labour when you have the BBC to oppose the Coalition?


My goodness, I thought I was dreaming. Did anyone else catch Peston on the Ten News just now waxing forth on “the green shoots of recovery”?I loved his line that “since it started in America”, then America is where it could all start recovering. Especially with King Obama now on the throne. Amazing – as we enter the darkness of depression, Peston is full on shilling for the Dear Leader!!!!